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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000232

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DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
NSC FOR HADLEY

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [AU](#) [UN](#) [SU](#) [US](#)
SUBJECT: GIVE "PLAN A" A CHANCE

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) In the past six months Khartoum has grudgingly shifted toward acceptance of the UN/African Union (AU) three-phase peace-keeping plan. President Bashir knows that the plan of regime hard-liners for a military solution to the problems of Darfur has failed, and persistent efforts by the USG, Kofi Annan, and several other governments has moved him toward accepting UN troops in Darfur. Now Bashir needs to be tested by UN/AU action, and the USG should try to move that test forward as vigorously as possible.

¶2. (C) Regarding AU/UN peace-keeping, action is needed on several fronts. Bashir has given a green light for the light support package -- but the UN has deployed only half of the 186 personnel because of its own bureaucratic issues. The AU has incorporated into its operations only two of the 38 UN military officers already in Darfur. Sudan has yet to respond to the UN/AU proposal on the heavy support package. We should: 1) Push the Sudanese to resolve any remaining bureaucratic impediments, such as our successful request this week regarding land for the UN in El Fasher; 2) Work with the UN and AU to remove their own blockages to deployments, without which there can be no testing of Bashir's position; 3) Insist that the Sudanese give a positive response to the UN/AU heavy support package within ten days and then resolve any remaining issues promptly; 4) Maintain a high-level dialogue with Bashir on planning for the hybrid operation that should begin later this year.

¶3. (S/NF) Sudan has demonstrated its willingness to take action at the request of Western governments in support of the global war on terror. On February 12, Sudan detained an individual who was part of a group planning to attack UN facilities here. The government is investigating additional leads in this case.

¶4. (C) Activity is picking up to restart political dialogue concerning Darfur. The internal non-signatory commanders have been gathering in North Darfur this week, and the Sudanese government has not impeded this gathering. Other non-signatory leaders are gathered in Chad, but this group seems to be controlled by Libya (with money) and Chad (with arms). This second group is rejecting negotiations based on the DPA and retaining a demand for regime change in Khartoum. Meanwhile, three months after the Addis Ababa AU/UN meeting, Salim Salim and Jan Eliasson have finally appeared for their first joint visit to Sudan. The long-delayed political process is beginning. The United States should increase the tempo of its own engagement on this dialogue with the AU/UN envoys, with the Sudanese government, and with the rebels. We need to work out a way to dissuade Libya from continuing its 30-year policy of destabilizing Darfur.

¶5. (C) Salva Kiir and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) have just decided to make another effort at launching a dialogue between the Darfur rebels and Khartoum. They want to urge the non-signatory groups to adopt a common position within the framework of the DPA and to participate in a political process managed by the AU and UN. The USG should welcome the SPLM role and give it explicit, high-level support.

¶6. (C) The rising level of violence against humanitarian workers is a significant problem. Most of this violence is caused by rebels, but some is caused by the government. Regarding the assault on humanitarian workers in Nyala, which the UN here does not believe represented government policy, the USG should insist that Sudan drop charges against the NGO workers and discipline those responsible. Furthermore, the U.S. should make a sustained effort, including during visits by S/E Natsios and A/S Lowenkron, to press Khartoum to resolve impediments to humanitarian work. (FYI: During this period, the State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs may be one of the two Sudanese officials indicted by the ICC for war crimes.)

¶7. (C) The next two months are an important period for moving forward implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The SPLM's recent decision to shift its headquarters from Juba to Khartoum is a symbol of its national role. When the Sudan Consortium meets in Khartoum on March 20, implementation of the CPA will be the issue on the table. A prior decision by the USG to impose stringent financial sanctions will deflect the discussion from what the parties and other donors are doing to support the CPA. That meeting presents an opportunity for a strong USG delegation to direct attention to those items of CPA implementation that have been

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lagging.

¶8. (C) Comment: The Sudanese government can always be difficult to deal with, but now there are some openings to pursue. We should take advantage of these developments to engage with those elements of the regime that want to work with us to stabilize Darfur, advance CPA implementation, and normalize relations. End comment.

HUME